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The Uncanny Swipe Drive: The Return of a Racist Mode of 
Algorithmic Thought on Dating Apps 
As algorithmic media amplify longstanding social oppression, they also seek to 
colonize every last bit of sociality where that oppression could be resisted. Swipe 
apps constitute prototypical examples of this dynamic. By employing protocols 
that foster absent-minded engagement, they allow unconscious racial preferences 
to be expressed without troubling users’ perceptions of themselves as non-racist. 
These preferences are then measured by recommender systems that treat 
“attractiveness” as a zero-sum game, allocate affective flows according to the 
winners and losers of those games, and ultimately amplify the salience of race as 
a factor of success for finding intimacy. In thus priming users to disassociate their 
behaviours from troubling networked effects, swipe apps recursively couple their 
unconscious biases with biased outcomes in a pernicious feedback loop. To resist 
this ideological severing of the personal from the networked, this paper analyses 
interviews from fifty online daters through a lens formulated as the “uncanny 
user unconscious.” This lens allows for the affective registration of abhorrent 
modes of distributed thoughts disavowed by the very users they are created from 
and coupled with. It may thus afford those seeking more ethical protocols of 
engagement some purchase on the all too familiar biases some algorithms both 













The Uncanny Swipe Drive: The Return of a Racist Mode of 
Algorithmic Thought on Dating Apps 
Introduction 
As scholars decry algorithmic oppression with increasing alarm, they also describe it as 
colonizing every last bit of sociality where it could be resisted. Swipe apps constitute a 
prototypical example of this development. By employing protocols that foster absent-
minded engagement, they allow unconscious racial preferences to be expressed without 
troubling users’ perceptions of themselves as non-racist. These preferences are then 
measured by recommender systems that treat “attractiveness” as a zero-sum game. 
Distributing digital traces of desire according to the winners and losers of those games, 
they then amplify the salience of race as a factor of success for finding intimate 
connections. So by allowing users to disassociate their behaviours from networked 
effects, swipe apps are able to recursively couple their unconscious biases with those 
effects in a pernicious feedback loop. 
To resist this severing of the personal from the networked, I analyse fifty 
interviews of online daters through a lens I call the “uncanny user unconscious.” This 
lens situates the disavowed digital traces Patricia Clough has formulated as the “user 
unconscious” within Sigmund Freud’s understanding of the uncanny: an ominous 
foreboding stemming from the imminent return of traumatic thoughts “long familiar to 
the psyche” but “estranged from it” via repression (Clough, 2018a; Freud, 2003, p. 
148). This lens will hopefully allow scholars, users, and creators to affectively register 
abhorrent modes of distributed thought disavowed by the very users they are created 
from and coupled with. Gaining purchase on the all too familiar biases platforms both 
amplify and repress might then allow more ethical protocols of engagement to be 
 
 
delimited, sought out, and devised. This theoretical lens is described in more detail 
following the literature review below.    
Literature review: racial bias in algorithmic media and dating platforms 
Racial bias in algorithmic media 
Much has been written about the amplification of inequality through algorithmic media 
(Pasquale, 2016; Srnicek, 2016). Deemed “weapons of math destruction” (O’Neil, 
2016), “artificial unintelligence” (Broussard, 2018), “algorithms of oppression” (Noble, 
2018), and the “new Jim Code” (Benjamin, 2019), they seem to be turning every last bit 
of life into digital grist for the analytic gaze of big data (Beer, 2018; Couldry & Mejias, 
2019). The amplification of racial bias is central to many of these critiques of 
algorithmic media (Benjamin, 2019; Cheney-Lippold, 2017; Couldry & Mejias, 2019; 
Noble, 2018; O’Neil, 2016).  
Noble (2018) shows how Google marginalizes people at the intersection of 
oppressions by allowing the porn industry to purchase any keyword it wants. This 
amplifies a pornographic white male gaze that views black girls as fetishized sex 
objects, mapping “old media traditions into new media architecture” through ostensibly 
colour-blind algorithms (2018, p. 24). The circulation of misrepresentative information 
of maligned groups in society is thus very profitable for Google. And its racism should 
be seen as symptomatic of racial bias deeply embedded within society rather than an 
unfortunate glitch. To fix these algorithms of oppression, Noble contends we must 
demand greater transparency in how they function. According to her, this would allow 
us to “transform the consciousness embedded in artificial intelligence, since it is in fact, 
in part, a product of our own collective creation” (2018, p. 29).   
 
 
Transforming this collective consciousness will not be easy. Indeed, Benjamin 
(2019) finds that black people are often disenfranchised by the very tech fixes devised 
to benefit them. But she warns we should not see this as a concerted effort by racist 
programmers to keep black people down. In fact, the effort to call out individual racism 
often distracts us from the slow death perpetuated by “subtler and even alluring forms 
of coded inequality” that go on under the radar (Benjamin, 2019, p. 24). A beauty 
contest conducted by Beauty AI illustrates this point. Programmed to determine beauty 
through pre-labelled images, it ultimately deemed white people to be the most beautiful 
because it learned from images labelled by people with racial biases. Thus, we should 
strive to make sure the data that machines learn from are unbiased. If they were, AI 
could help us “subvert the status quo by exposing and authenticating the existence of 
systemic inequality” and, ultimately, allow us to “come to grips with our deeply held 
cultural and institutionalized biases” (2019, p. 65). 
The transparency and oversight Noble and Benjamin see as solutions to the 
problem of anti-black bias in algorithmic media is questioned by Keeling (2019). She 
describes the roots of today’s digital inequality as stemming from financial “futures” 
devised to protect investments in black bodies during the slave trade. Chattel slavery 
should thus be seen as “the foundation for present relations of exploitation and 
domination” within today’s economy based on financial speculation (Keeling, 2019, p. 
24). Coming to terms with this historical trauma is difficult because multicultural 
neoliberalism profits from representations that celebrate racial difference, while 
maintaining socioeconomic relations rooted in white supremacy. This makes it clear 
that “the benefits of visibility are unevenly distributed” within today’s methods of 
measure and recognition (Keeling, 2019, pp. 100–111). 
 
 
Algorithmic media is also working to colonize every last space where a critique 
of it could take place, according to Couldry and Mejias (2019). They explain that data 
colonialism has roots going back to the 16th century, but rather than capture populations 
and annex territories, it forces sociality through economically exploitable protocols. In 
this way, it has supplanted the democratic potential of user-to-user interaction with a 
cloud empire. In this empire, users no longer produce or own anything; rather, they rent 
data from the cloud while providing it with free data. And as the internet of things takes 
over the home for big-data ventures, mobile phones never allow a moment’s reprieve 
from corporate surveillance. These new data relations allow media to extract a profit 
from people even as their purchasing power has dwindled from decades of neoliberal 
policies. The terms digital “natives” and data “mining” render explicit the link between 
the cloud empire and datafication, exploitation and machine learning, colonization of 
lives and algorithmic speculation. Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of this 
colonization is that corporations now produce the data from which knowledge of the 
social is formed. It is thus threatening to fashion knowledge of the world and our 
imagination in its own image (Couldry & Mejias, 2019).  
Racial bias on dating platforms 
Dating platforms have also been critiqued for their racial biases. Studies of dating sites 
have found their users have more pronounced racial preferences than their search 
criteria would suggest (Alhabash et al., 2014; Anderson et al., 2014); women return 
more messages from men of equal to more desired racial statuses on them; and black 
women receive fewer responses on them from everyone except black men (Lin & 
Lundquist, 2013; Rudder, 2015). Furthermore, recommender systems can treat new 
 
 
users who do not have revealed1 preferences as though they are long-term users with 
similar profiles (T. Wang et al., 2011). This would make it impossible to circumvent the 
racial biases of the entire network of past and present users on dating platforms. It has 
also been found that increasing the size of photos on OkCupid amplifies the effect of 
“attractiveness” on the number of messages users receive (Rudder, 2015, p. 123). This 
indicates that the centrality of images on swipe apps is likely to amplify racial bias on 
them because this bias is imbedded in “attractiveness” scores generated from pooled 
preferences of online daters. Some have also found that profiles on apps catering to the 
LGBTQ community are racist (Hutson et al., 2018). They thus suggest that dating 
platforms should carefully consider the categories they allow users to filter for, do a 
better job of monitoring messages, and inform users of the detrimental effects of racist 
language on profiles (Hutson et al., 2018). While these are good suggestions, they are 
unlikely to alter liking and messaging patterns, which are influenced more by 
recommender systems than written content on profiles and messages. These suggestions 
also do not address the shift from dating websites to apps, where users are increasingly 
recommended to each other according to interactive data such as liking and messaging 
patterns rather than deliberate search queries and profile descriptions.  
This ignoring of the shift to interactive data is largely due to the proprietary 
nature of the big data captured by platforms and the algorithms they use to analyse it. 
But media scholars have begun interrogating digital platforms through the lens of 
algorithmic imaginaries (Bucher, 2017). In these studies, users have been found to alter 
their engagement on Facebook and Instagram to ensure their posts are prominently 
 
1 Revealed preferences are “revealed” by liking and messaging patterns of users rather than 
what they say they want on profiles or indicate what they want through search criteria. 
 
 
placed (Bucher, 2017; Cotter, 2019), avoid unwanted connections by not using certain 
words and providing screenshots instead of links (van der Nagel, 2018), exchange views 
on algorithmic manipulation of users emotions (Hallinan et al., 2020), and make 
information about algorithms more widely available (Cotter, 2019). In this way, some 
algorithmic imaginaries circumvent platforms’ attempts to strategically disclose how 
their algorithms function to some, while hiding this information from others (Cotter, 
2019).  
While online dating has quickly surpassed other ways of finding sexual partners 
(Rosenfeld & Thomas, 2012), with over 40 percent of couples having met online by 
2017 (Rosenfeld et al., 2019), the way algorithms on dating platforms make users feel is 
unclear. It has been found that couples who met online experience lower rates of 
divorce and express more satisfaction than those who met via other means (Cacioppo et 
al., 2013). This suggests that the algorithms employed by dating platforms may lead to 
better relationship outcomes. But scholars contend there is no scientific evidence that 
algorithms can predict compatibility (Finkel et al., 2012; Hitsch et al., 2010; Joel et al., 
2017a). Perhaps, then, it is belief in algorithms that explains these positive outcomes, as 
this leads to more personal disclosure and less uncertainty before a date (Sharabi, 2020). 
It has also been found that online daters are not usually aware of the precise formulation 
of matching algorithms (Sharabi & Dykstra-DeVette, 2019), do not usually take issue 
with the way recommendations are made by them (Lorenza Parisi & Comunello, 2020), 
and consider them to be innocuous ritual tools, even when problematic historical biases 
are embedded in them (S. Wang, 2020). 
While the algorithmic imaginary is a way of studying algorithms without having 
access to their precise formulation, the critique proposed in this paper builds from a 
comparison of OkCupid’s and Tinder’s algorithmic recommender systems. I go into 
 
 
more detail about these systems in the discussion. But for now, it should be noted that 
whereas OkCupid’s Match system assumes idiosyncratic attraction based on many user-
adjustable variables, Tinder’s “attractiveness” scale assumes attraction to be a universal 
quality measurable by the ratio of right to left swipes users receive. I propose that these 
differences make Tinder a prototypical platform for understanding the way life and 
subjectivity is being appified today, a process which some have argued began around 
2010 (Couldry & Mejias, 2019; Light et al., 2016). The transition from OkCupid to 
swipe apps that many of my respondents made indicates an acceleration of neoliberal 
competition, hierarchization, and control. But it also constitutes a shift form 
neoliberalism. This is because entrepreneurs of themselves are less central to today’s 
economy. Indeed, the affective flows of communication in today’s mediasphere renders 
user rationality tangential, if not largely incompatible, with profit making. 
While debates over whether dating apps are superficial (David & Cambre, 2016) 
or not  (Carpenter & McEwan, 2016; Enomoto et al., 2017; Hobbs et al., 2016) have 
been a point of contention, this paper addresses the shift from dating sites to apps in 
terms of its impact on race. This shift seems to have created an affective milieu well-
suited for implicit racism to flourish. Implicit racism is an unconscious bias that leads 
one to overvalue races that society privileges and undervalue races that society 
disadvantages (Dovidio et al., 2016). These unconscious biases become ingrained in 
psyches at a young age because of racist media and social structures within the United 
States. This unconscious racism is increasingly at odds with the non-racist worldview 
that many hold, a disconnect between unconscious and conscious thoughts that has been 
called “aversive racism” (Dovidio et al., 2016). Unconscious racism becomes more 
pronounced in those with aversive racism when it is easier to discriminate against 
 
 
certain races without troubling one’s self-image as non-prejudiced. An important 
through line in this paper is that swipe apps constitute one such context.  
Given this milieu of swipe apps, where unconscious racism can easily become 
embedded in coded protocols determining social life and death against users’ wishes, a 
framework seems needed to allow users to gain some purchase on how they are being 
used by them. To that end, I argue that swipe apps should be seen through the 
theoretical lens of the uncanny user unconscious, which I develop below. 
Theoretical lens: from the death drive to the uncanny user unconscious 
This theoretical lens situates the death drive and biopower within the user unconscious 
and, in turn, embeds the user unconscious within the uncanny. It is split into three 
sections: first, resonances between biopolitics and the death drive are highlighted; 
second, the implications of information theory for understanding the death drive are 
outlined; and third, an explanation of the critical import the uncanny lends to the user 
unconscious is given.  
The origin of processes now animating the unconscious: biopower and the death 
drive:   
Foucault (1978) described biopower as a transition from governments taking the lives of 
subjects to assessing, managing, and orchestrating populations in the 18th century. This 
concern with population management – generating, fostering, and optimizing the 
workforce – coincided with the bloodiest atrocities ever recorded, from genocidal 
conquests to chattel slavery to the Nazi holocaust. This was no coincidence according to 
Foucault. The ostensible focus on public health, increasing birth rates, and reducing the 
ravages of deceases made genocidal pogroms, medicalized sexuality, and eugenics-
based immigration policies seem natural.  
 
 
Foucault’s understanding of biopower resonates with the dualistic battle between 
life and death Freud proposes in Civilization and its Discontents (2019). In this book, 
Freud contends there is an interlinked dynamic between “eros” and “death” that drives 
the development of individuals, societies, and the human species. Eros is fairly 
straightforward: it looks to foster the life of individuals and the human species through 
the libido, causes individuals to come together to propagate, and leads to large groups of 
people in civilizations. The death drive is harder to detect: it overrides the pleasure 
principle, compels people to repeat past traumatic experiences, and fosters excessive 
acts of aggression. Civilization subdues this aggression through the superego, which 
creates an overbearing conscience in subjects, forcing them to bottle up aggression in an 
unsustainable way. According to Freud, this death drive tends to erupt in mass 
destruction when it is not adequately addressed (2019). So just as Foucault details the 
atrocities perpetuated by societies ostensibly bent on optimizing life, the death drive 
points to repetitive trauma undergirding the more easily discernible forces of “eros”. 
Both the “death” drive and biopower can thus be seen as exposing the sordid underbelly 
of life.  
Dean (2009) has noted the link between biopolitics and the death drive as well. 
She claims biopolitics is “a politics of the death drive” because it pulls society out of the 
“natural rhythms and processes of organic life” (p. 3). But for Freud, the death drive 
pulls society apart as a capitulation to nature, not a transgression of it. That is, it obeys 
the second law of thermodynamics, which states that closed systems become 
increasingly disordered over time (Tran The et al., 2020). According to Freud, then, life 
is an emergent process borne of oscillations between order and disorder. While “eros” 
struggles for order against the disorder of the “death” drive, we see life as that which 
flourishes above the fray, a lovely ordering of matter into organisms, species, and 
 
 
civilizations. Freud tells us that just below this façade of life is a morbid force looking 
to erupt.  
Freud saw the death drive as a strange compulsion that goes beyond the pleasure 
principle, but Lacan claims it goes beyond death itself: a “Will to destruction. Will to 
make a fresh start. Will for an Other-thing” (1997, p. 212). This positions humans as 
creators after the death of god, according to Lacan. He explains that this is an 
impressive feat because it is not “difficult to make what is called thought emerge from 
the evolution of matter…. What is difficult to make emerge from the evolution of matter 
is quite simply homo faber” (1997, p. 214). In this way, Lacan inverts the death drive: 
no longer leading to destruction, it becomes the ground of emergence for a godless 
homo faber. This inversion is congruent with a paradigm shift that took place in the 
interim between Civilization and its Discontents and Lacan’s reading of it quoted above. 
I turn to this shift next because it is a crucial link between the user unconscious and the 
death drive.   
Turning death into life: how disorder became crucial to the creation of new forms 
of life in the second half of the twentieth century 
While Freud’s model for the death drive was the entropic heat death of the universe, his 
model for life was the struggle for homeostasis discernible in the steam engine (Luciana 
Parisi, 2004). From this perspective, he saw humans and groups as seeking to maintain 
homeostasis in systems constantly threatened with dissipation. This required them to 
use external sources of energy without altering their internal function (Luciana Parisi, 
2004). 
After the turn of the twentieth century, scientific thought began investigating 
open systems that did not tend toward homeostasis – in quantum mechanics, chaos 
theory, and information theory, for instance. The latter would become central to 
 
 
cybernetics and our increasingly digital world beginning with Shannon’s formula for 
information in 1948. This formula was nearly identical to the one it superseded, except 
for one change: the sign preceding it was flipped from negative to positive. This flip 
inverted the relationship between entropy and information, altering the way noise, 
turbulence, and randomness would be seen thereafter. Rather than the result of 
dissipation and portending death, entropy would be seen as the foundation of useful 
information and the emergence of life (Clough, 2010, pp. 217–218). Inverting the 
relationship between entropy and life made it possible to modulate affect in the 
economy because energy could be seen as an always informing and formative measure. 
Energy in human bodies could be captured as information, and energy from the 
environment could penetrate them in ways that altered their informational substrate 
(Clough, 2010, p. 221). In this way, the human body would become an assemblage of 
“organic and non-organic life” that goes “beyond the organism as an entropic, closed 
system” (Clough, 2003, p. 362).  
This shift to modulating affective information coincides with the transition to an 
information economy and a mode of production that makes extensive use of affective 
labour (Castells, 2009; Hardt & Negri, 2001). But seeing the economy as working 
through the modulation of affect in itself rather than affective labour highlights the 
becoming independent of affect from individuals (Clough, 2018b).  
The transition to modulating affect also coincides with a shift from state-centred 
to neoliberal biopolitics (Foucault, 2010). This shift is seen most acutely in America, 
where economic rationality would colonize an ever-expanding remit of social life, from 
immigration and crime to finding a spouse and raising children. A key difference 
between liberals and neoliberals is that the latter no longer saw workers as productive or 
unproductive from birth; instead, they saw them as enterprising entrepreneurs of 
 
 
themselves, susceptible to market-based incentives compelling them to increase their 
productivity throughout their entire lives (Foucault, 2010).  
As an unalterable, ascribed status, it is hard to see how race could be used as a 
locus of incitement for people conceived as entrepreneurs of themselves (Foucault, 
2010, p. 228). Moreover, racism is difficult to detect in neoliberal governmentality 
because it feels like less of an imposition than previous modes of governance. Instead of 
disciplining bodies or internally subjugating individuals, it would optimize “systems of 
difference,” tolerate “minority individuals and practices,” and adjusts “the rules of the 
game” (Foucault, 2010, p. 260). In other words, neoliberalism uncovers a detailed grid 
of behavioural responsiveness to environmental variables that are then calibrated for 
profitability (Foucault, 2010, p. 259).  
Deleuze has outlined this transition to neoliberalism as one in which power 
controls dividuals rather than individuals (1992). Dividuals are datafied fragments of 
individuals pulled apart by the intense competition immanent to networked 
neoliberalism in “societies of control” (1992). These societies implement a new form of 
racism that Clough and Willse call “population racism” (2011, p. 51). No longer 
working to control groups of human beings, this racism functions by statistically 
organizing and manipulating “groupings of characteristics, features, or parts” through 
algorithmic analyses (Clough & Willse, 2011, p. 52). Many of the arguments made 
about structural racism embedded in big data colonization (Couldry & Mejias, 2019), 
algorithms of oppression (Noble, 2018), and the new Jim code (Benjamin, 2019), which 
I outlined in the literature review, confirm this move to modulating parts of datafied 
selves (Cheney-Lippold, 2017). While proxies for race are regularly put to use by 
algorithms mining vast caches of data, the effects of race on their output becomes 
buried in impenetrable jumbles of code (O’Neil, 2016). Crucially, Clough and Willse 
 
 
explain that this population racism works by calibrating affective milieus to bring about 
future effects (2011, p. 53).  
To render this notion of affective milieus more concrete, we might think of 
affects as strong attractions toward or away from objects (Kernberg, 2009), two states 
that coincide with swipe app protocols. The “death” drive can then be seen as working 
through swipe apps to compel, amass, and agglomerate these affects – traces of desire 
written in binary and from which social life and death are determined. This makes it 
clear that speculating algorithms profit from creating affective milieus that facilitate 
social connection, engagement, and privilege only against an underlying amplification 
of social death. Irreducible to intrapsychic or “interpersonal processes” (Hartman, 2020, 
p. 318), this social death is animated by algorithmic assessments of risk that cross 
“intra-, inter-, and ultrapsychic registers,” with heightened risk all too often attributed to 
non-white users in normatively white collectives (Hartman, 2019, p. 96).  
To discern the entanglement of this social death with today’s mode of 
algorithmic repression requires a critique that goes beyond the individual subject 
(Clough & Johanssen, 2020). Indeed, as algorithms learn by probing noisy data in 
search of profitable forms of networked engagement, they break down the bodies, 
habits, and rituals of individuals, reconfiguring them as users to surreptitiously 
speculate upon (Clough 2018:107). With speculation now central to algorithmic media, 
venture capital, and tech start-ups, the conceit that human speculation is the seat and 
benchmark of reason in contrast to machinic instrumentalism is troubled. This requires a 
reformulation of the mind and its relation to the unconscious (Clough, 2019). I explain 




The uncanny user unconscious  
Clough’s notion of the “user unconscious” goes a long way towards reformulating the 
unconscious for today’s speculative data logic (Clough, 2018a). She explains that this 
unconscious is now constituted from ubiquitous appeals to you that come from others 
on platforms such as YouTube, Instagram, and Twitter. These appeals have led to 
communities in which feelings of love and hate, comradery and shame are amplified 
(Chun, 2016). But you are not only addressed by others online. You are also addressed 
by algorithmic systems allocating access to affective flows of communication: systems 
that determine who gets recommended to whom on dating apps, who sees which posts 
on Facebook, and which hashtags go viral on Twitter. Platforms do this by mining your 
networked engagement and comparing it to others that have inhabited the network 
before you. This is what I see as the deepest recess of the user unconscious, where 
digital traces from the cloud, “no matter how disavowed, are becoming an intimate part 
of the I” (2018b, p. xxxii).  
As a vastly distributed, massively networked, and eminently affective mode of 
thought, the user unconscious belies the conceit that humans can think in more complex 
and creative ways than computational media. As such, it points to more than an 
economic mode of analysis hiding social death within it. It points to the coupling of 
users with an affective milieu that embeds trauma in algorithms governing the defining 
edge of sociality today: impetuous transgressions of the personal and the networked 
necessitated by today’s promiscuously connected machines (Chun, 2016; Clough, 
2018b, p. XXII).  
While Clough does not invoke Freud in her elaboration of the user unconscious, 
the preceding discussion has sought to situate his notion of the death drive within it. 
Both the death drive and biopolitics dissolve social cohesion and the autopoietic body, 
 
 
leaving dividual competition modulated by undulating networks of affective flows in 
their place – vast networks of turbulent data churning up sociality via speculating 
algorithms. But as life today is understood to be in a constant state of flux, with minute 
changes constantly reverberating through open, non-equilibrium systems, it is 
imperative to go beyond normative assumptions about life and death, stability and 
volatility, order and disorder to critique biopolitics. Seeing the death drive and 
biopolitics as working in tandem to create traumatic thoughts within the user 
unconscious is meant to render the opacity of platforms a bit clearer, alerting us to the 
uncanny return of disavowed thoughts we are being used to create, largely against our 
conscious wishes.   
To see why the uncanny provides a critical contribution to the user unconscious, 
one must recall Freud’s essay outlining its essential features (2003). He first tells us that 
our typical understanding of the word is incomplete, that there is nothing particularly 
uncanny when inanimate things seem to come alive. Indeed, he quickly dismisses the 
mechanical dolls considered uncanny when he was writing as unworthy of the term. 
This is because he saw the uncanny as stemming from long repressed modes of thought 
that were threatening to return (2003, p. 147). 
As was the case a century ago, I would like to propose that there is a repressed 
mode of thought threating to return today. And as with Freud, I see it as having little to 
do with things being on the verge of springing to life. Far from instilling ominous 
foreboding, the liveliness of things is a mundane fact of life today. And as much as we 
are encouraged to think of our machines as magically assembling things into 
synchronized swarms, optimized flows, and turbocharged equilibria, few of my 
respondents bought into this techno-utopian hype. Today, the uncanny return of 
 
 
repressed modes of thought comes from algorithms stringing engagement most people 
would not consider problematic into profitable milieus that most people would. 
So the critical import of seeing the user unconscious as uncanny is not that it 
alerts us to the disequilibrium of biopolitics, nor that life is always tinged with death. 
These are tenets of today’s neoliberal zeitgeist, central to our techno-utopian ideology 
presenting creative destruction, disruptive innovation, and turbulent data as crucial to 
the capacity of platforms to add value to users’ lives. The critical import of seeing the 
user unconscious as uncanny is that it allows us to uncover repressed modes of 
disavowed thoughts undergirding algorithmic media, machine learning, and artificial 
intelligence.  
Freud’s psychanalytic project has been characterized as a conservative force, 
making the strange familiar by rendering anomalous thought processes intelligible 
against the backdrop of a family drama (Fisher, 2018, p. 10). Indeed, psychoanalysis 
has often been complicit in creating subjects in the image of dominant social forces, 
most recently lending its energies to the child-rearing concerns central to neoliberalism 
(Rozmarin, 2020). But beneath this conservatism is a countervailing move, a move that 
renders the familiar strange, our most cherished memories as screens covering events 
too traumatic to remember having lived. Freud’s notion of the uncanny recursively 
couples these two movements. It estranges us from the familiar narratives we tell about 
ourselves while revealing our thoughts to be abhorrent in an all too familiar way. 
Highlighting this uncanny coupling allows for the affective registration of the return of 
thoughts we have long prided ourselves on overcoming but that algorithmic media 
implicate us within again.  
I explore this framework more concretely in the discussion and conclusion, 




This analysis is based on fifty interviews taken in 2017 for an exploratory investigation 
into dating apps. I found these respondents through snowball sampling, starting with my 
own networks on social media and branching out from there. The average age of the 
sample was thirty-two years old, and they had all used at least one dating platform. 
There were twenty men, thirty women, thirty White, twenty people of colour, forty 
straight, and ten who were not straight in the sample. Five respondents were working in 
the online-dating industry: analysing data, consulting app creators, coaching online 
daters, making a documentary about online dating, and marketing a dating website.  
The interviews were open-ended and took place in bars and coffee shops in New 
York City. In them, I fist asking about any differences my respondents found between 
dates they had encountered through dating platforms and those they had found through 
other means. I then asked about any differences they saw between the various platforms 
they had used, memorable dates or relationships they had made through them, what they 
would like to see changed on them, and anything else they found interesting about their 
experiences using them.  
About two-thirds of my respondents showed me their profile on at least one app 
they were using. While they did this, I asked them to tell me how they felt about their 
profile, why they had chosen the pictures they had put on them, and what they were 
thinking about while writing their “bios.” After going over their profile with them, I had 
them swipe on about twenty profiles, asking them to tell me why they had swiped left or 
right. Nine of my respondents let me look at some of the messages they had sent and 
received. On average, the interviews took fifty-six minutes. The longest was two hours 
and four minutes, while the shortest was twenty-two minutes. I recorded and transcribed 
all of them.  
 
 
I explore two interrelated themes that came up in those interviews below: first, 
the strangely compelling drive to swipe induced by swipe apps; and second, the racial 
preferences amplified by them.  
Findings: the racist swipe drive 
The drive to swipe 
The first dating app for touchscreen phones with general appeal was Tinder.2 Created in 
2012, by 2015 it was the most popular dating platform available (Ansari & Klinenberg, 
2016). Tinder’s success is partially due to the swipe interface it introduced, where users 
are presented with a stack of photos to swipe right on if they want to connect and left on 
if they do not. This photo can be tapped to show more pictures and a brief space for text 
known as a “bio.” Some users leave this space blank, while others write a few words, 
emojis, or sentences to give their profile some flair. Only users that both swipe right on 
each other can exchange messages.  
When I began interviewing in 2017, Tinder had already swept through the date-
o-sphere – the rapidly evolving ecology of dating platforms (Slater, 2013) – and some 
new apps were becoming increasingly popular. Tinder, OkCupid, Bumble, Coffee 
Meets Bagel, Hinge, and The League were the most popular platforms used by my 
respondents. Most of them were using more than one app, and they generally viewed 
them as an inevitable part of dating today. Many of the apps they were using are seen as 
Tinder clones because they copied its minimalistic aesthetic and signature feature – 
swiping.  
 
2 Grindr was successful in the gay community three years prior to this. 
 
 
Swipe apps move the initial decision of whom to pursue from deliberate 
searches to visceral swiping. This is likely to alter what is captured by them and what 
can be coupled with the habits of their users. A key finding from my research is that 
many of my respondents described swiping as addicting because matching with others 
felt like a jolt of recognition. For instance, Jane was worried she was swiping as a 
substitute for a relationship. She says: 
I did Tinder, but I only did that as a diversion. I never met up with anyone. It was 
just like playing a game. – Was it fun at all? (my words are bold) – I think it was 
just a substitute for having a relationship and not really being ready to date. – So 
you got enjoyment out of matching with someone? – I did. I would say there 
was probably like a pleasure in, hmm, how many people might be attracted to my 
profile. – And then did you talk to anyone? – On Tinder, no.  
While Jane got pleasure from playing Tinder like a game, this did not lead to the 
superficial hookups some have proposed it would (David & Cambre, 2016). Tinder was 
seen as a game by my respondents strictly in the sense quoted above, without implying 
anything beyond the interface. Nevertheless, the excitement of matching was readily 
apparent during my interviews. Jane even equated it to a shot of dopamine:  
I would swipe right. I would like him. It’s a match! – Look at you. He’s probably 
going to say hi to you, and then you can ignore him like you do most of the 
people. – Yeah, you got it. – Haha, but that was fun. At least he matched with 
you. – Yes, seriously. That is like dopamine. I’m like, “Great we matched! That’s 
enough for today.” 
Swiping for the dopamine is a far cry from looking for a substantial connection, but the 
immediate validation users got from a match was hard for them to resist. Hilary 
explains: 
I mostly just swipe and don’t answer people that message me. It’s just like for 
validation. – What kind of validation do you get from it? – I guess if people like 
 
 
you, they consider you attractive or whatever. And like dudes mostly swipe right 
on everyone I think, so it’s not like real validation.  
While Hilary considered the validation she got from a match to be unreal, she continued 
to swipe as though it was real. Similarly, Tom said the dopamine rush from a mutual 
like was sometimes all he used Tinder for: 
Some people are on Tinder just for the dopamine. They’re just like, “Oh cool!” and 
then like they’re done. And then that’s it. And they just want to be liked. I have 
done that sometimes. Like, “Ahhhh! I don’t know why I’m swiping! I’ve had days 
where I’m like, “Swipe, swipe, swipe, swipe right. Everyone swipe right.” And I’m 
like, “Am I ugly? No! I’m not! OK!” And then that’s it. 
As Tom suggests, swiping can activate dopamine centers in the brain, making it very 
addicting. Similarly, Lucy explained that she had tried to stop using multiple times, 
saying “It can become a bit addictive. And I have deleted it. Like I don’t know if that. 
Like off and on deleting and then reinstating it.” Swiping is addicting because it feels 
like a game of chance, with a match creating a burst of excitement designed to hook 
users on the app. Jenny felt this game-like aspect was probably why her matches rarely 
bothered to text her:  
If I get matches, the likelihood that somebody messages me or that I message them 
is very low. I think people are just playing the game, playing it like a game. But 
then they’re like, “Fuck, I don’t want to do.” I think everyone’s gone through the 
whole thing, and either it worked out and they met someone, or they just got really 
discouraged. 
As these users suggest, swipe apps may have been too addicting for their own good. 
They were soon overrun by compulsively swiping users that rarely bothered to engage 
in verbal communication at all.  
 
 
This compulsive swiping seemed nonsensical to many of my respondents. For 
instance, Stacy considered the whole process to be really weird, explaining that she 
mostly uses them “out of boredom. It’s so stupid. It’s a mindless, pointless act.” 
Likewise, Mandy displayed a pretty common paradox, exclaiming her aversion to swipe 
apps, while continuing to use: “I’m telling you, Tinder and Bumble I can’t. I hate them 
so. – Did you meet anyone from Tinder and Bumble? – This guy is from Tinder. The 
one I’m going to meet today. – Oh, OK.” She is clearly fed up with swipe apps, yet 
continues to spend time and energy to make them work. As users swipe against their 
own better judgement, the swipe drive can be activated by the flick of a thumb, leading 
to long hours of swiping, streams of messages, and multiple dates a day.  
While my respondents generally took their compulsive use to be a mindless bit 
of fun or aggravation, few linked this engagement to networked flows of affect 
distributed by speculating algorithms. This is a key feature of the user unconscious, 
which seeks to downplay the way individual use is linked to networked effects. As this 
paper is meant to render this link more discernible, I turn next to a problematic effect of 
this dynamic: the linking of users’ racial preferences to the value assessed to users on 
swipe apps.  
The racial preferences of my respondents 
Many of my respondents rejected profiles during the interactive portion of my 
interviews because of looks. They said their potential dates looked too short, ugly, fat, 
feminine, etc. This made them seem superficial. But having them swipe during the 
interview probably led them to make superficial assessments, as there is little besides 
looks to base swiping decisions on.  
Race was one of many reasons my respondents cited for swiping left or right. 
Determining if racial preferences for selecting a date is problematic would run counter 
 
 
to the theoretical framework I have been arguing for in this paper: that is, a time when 
we could think in terms of personal preference is gone. Indeed, the notion that personal 
preferences should be considered independently from their networked effects seems to 
be central to today’s techo-utopian ideology, which looks to sever the link between the 
personal and the networked in the minds of users while requiring the transgression of 
that link in every use. Rather than focus on individual acts, then, I am looking to detail 
how these preferences are worked into and coupled with networked flows of affect. This 
connection is made more explicitly in the discussion section, but as the basis for that 
discussion, I outline a few of my respondents reasons for their racial preferences below.  
I begin with Jenny to illustrate the extent to which I had to prompt my 
respondents to describe why they were swiping left or right on profiles. Jenny is more 
forthcoming than a lot of my respondents, most of whom found it exceedingly hard to 
convey, or even know, why they were swiping left or right. She says, 
The time when I downloaded Tinder during spring break, I downloaded Coffee 
Meets Bagel as well. I didn't like it. – Why? – It was just all nerdy Asian guys – 
Do you have a certain criteria for who you would like to date or is it kind of 
General. – I mean you are seeing the people I am swiping on. They are all very, 
very different. – Can we do this exercise really quick to just see how you are 
swiping? [Here I am reiterating the fact that I want Jenny to tell me why she 
is swiping left or right instead swiping silently] – I would swipe left because. – 
The first picture? What is wrong with it? – I just don't like that. It is like part of 
his face. – Oh because it's like the side of his face? – Yeah. and he's not smiling 
too. – This next one is smiling. – I don't like this one. I don't know. I'm just not 
into. – You can see more of his face. – his look. – Any particular part of the 
look that you don’t like? Or you just can't explain it? – Yeah, I just don't like 
that at all. – Like the sunglasses are too flashy or something? – I don't like the 
beard [swipe left]. – Okay, that makes sense. [She swipes left on another 
profile]. Another guy with a beard? – No, it's just not attractive to me [swipe 
left]. Him neither [swipe left]. – Not him either? – Not him either [swipe left]. – 
You seem to swipe a lot to the left. – Yeah, if there is no picture then definitely 
 
 
not, this one is like Blurry. – He is blurry? – He looks like kind of smart though, 
so I will look. – [She taps the profile picture to see more photos]. Okay, he has 
glasses, looks like a dancer. – Oh, that's weird, no. Yeah, no [swipe left]. – No? – 
No. Sunglasses you can't really see. I just feel like they have something to hide, 
you know? [swipe left] – If they have sunglasses? Okay. – No, he has a kid, even 
though he might say ‘that’s my nephew,’ I still won’t [swipe left]. – Even though, 
eh? – This one is all blurry. I don't like his sunglasses [swipe left]. – What's with 
the sunglasses on all of these guys? – I just don't like it. – Yes, I understand. I 
don't know why people would put sunglasses on their first picture. – Not 
attracted to black guys [swipe left]. – Okay. – I don't know. I don't like how he 
looks. Don't like him [swipe left]. Don't like him [swipe left]. Why are they giving 
me such bum guys? – I don't know. – Wait I think I know that guy [swipe left]. 
Nope [swipe left]. Nope [swipe left]. Nope [swipe left]. – Wow. – Like, Tinder is 
really hard. 
In this exchange, it is clear that Jenny found it difficult to articulate why she was 
swiping left on profiles. This was the case with many of those that I interviewed. To me, 
this indicates that they were not accustomed to thinking about their swiping decisions, 
at least not in a verbal way. This illustrates one way in which Tinder’s interface primes 
users for absent-minded engagement in which unconscious racism can flourish.  
Mindlessly swiping on profiles allows race to influence one’s swiping decisions 
in a less direct way than checking a box to indicate one’s preference, making it seem 
less racist. For instance, Julia first explains that she has a racial preference, saying: 
You can tell the Tinder rating by who you are receiving, and I would say that I 
don’t like the fact that I have a racial preference, but I do. And it would be mainly 
white men, second mainly Asian men, but mostly white men, and I wasn’t 
receiving that many.  
Julia gave up on Tinder because she wasn’t receiving the kinds of users she preferred. 
But this did not lead her to an interface that would allow her to filter for race by 
checking a box. She explains, 
 
 
I wasn’t using Tinder because I specifically wanted to find somebody, and it was 
only to try it out for fun. So I think if I was kind of looking more seriously, then I 
would research it and look into other apps. But I don’t have much knowledge of 
them. I just know that they exist, but not that much. – Yeah because some of them 
allow you to say that “I want black men or white men or whatever.” – At the 
same time, even though I do have a preference, I would feel bad about discounting 
people because my preference isn’t exclusive. It’s just a preference. But I’ve also 
met people who do not fit my preferences and have liked them or dated them or 
whatever. 
Julia’s racial preferences are fairly complex. She is Indian and was living in NYC when 
I interviewed her. She knows that she will eventually have to find someone from the 
same Indian background as herself in order to be accepted by her family, but while she 
is dating casually, she is looking to date outside of her race. While Julia was open to 
dating all races, however, she detected a racial hierarchy embedded in the recommender 
system itself. That is, the racial hierarchy of preferences she was not proud of seemed to 
be reflected back on her as a person of colour in terms of the likes she was receiving.  
Grace also explained a similar hierarchy of racial attraction discernible in the 
messages one is likely to get:  
If you are like a 10, you might get a call from each and every person on the site, 
but if you are a seven and a half, maybe you will not get messages from, say, 
Asians or whites. I got a lot of hits, interestingly enough, from black men.  
Grace felt that racial preferences were more important on swipe apps because they put 
looks front and centre:  
It is not people being racist. Maybe it’s just their attraction, which is different for 
different races. If you’re purely going by the looks factor and not counting the 
personality factor, a lot of people are attracted to, say, blonde women versus 
Asians versus Indians, and maybe black women are lower. If we are on the list, we 
are on the list for some fun, but not for some serious relationship, you know?  
 
 
While Grace acknowledges that having a racial preference does not make one racist, Jon 
notes that he is conflicted about wanting to filter for race on dating apps: 
I would add like a filter. I mean, if you could filter people, then I would, definitely. 
Because as of now, for Tinder, really, the only filters is male, female, age, location, 
distance, and that’s pretty much it. So if I had to add something. I mean, dude, 
that’s weird, because what if I say I prefer whites or Asians? That’s kind of. – 
Well, a lot of apps have that. – Really? – Yeah. – I didn’t know that. Because on 
some level, that seems racist. – Hahaha. – Right? – On some level, yeah. 
As Jon and Julia make clear, there is a sense that filtering for race by clicking a button is 
more racist than simply swiping according to one’s racial preferences. In the following 
discussion I look to unpack this common assumption. 
Discussion: 
The interviews quoted above illustrate how swipe apps prime users to mindlessly swipe, 
compelling them to privilege looks above other qualities and making race a more salient 
factor in their swiping decisions. In this discussion, I explain why this drive to swipe 
should not be dissociated from the uncanny user unconscious. I do this by detailing how 
swiping becomes recursively coupled with speculating algorithms on swipe apps. To 
flesh this out, I compare OkCupid’s match percentage to Tinder’s “attractiveness” scale. 
While both of these systems are still used, I argue that the move many of my 
respondents made from dating websites to apps points to a more general shift in the 
data-o-sphere for three reasons: First, my respondents considered dating apps to have 
supplanted dating websites; second, OkCupid’s user interface has become more like 
Tinder’s over the past five years, with many now using its swipe app; and third, the 
match percentage is no longer as central to OkCupid’s recommender system as it once 
was. Tinder’s user interface and recommender system can thus be seen as partially 
 
 
supplanting OkCupid’s, both because of its popularity and because its business model 
has been copied by many other dating apps, including OkCupid’s. Understanding why 
Tinder’s recommender system is likely to amplify racially biased outcomes is thus 
important because it indicates the trajectory the date-o-sphere seems to be heading. 
Tinder’s recommender system is likely to amplify racially biased outcomes 
because it uses an “attractiveness” scale based on pooled preferences to recommend 
users to each other. This is different from OkCupid’s match3 percentage, which is 
calculated using an algorithm that incorporates hundreds of multiple-choice questions 
that users answer. Users can also determine which questions to answer, how much 
weight to give each question, and how they want their matches to answer questions.  
On the other hand, Tinder has admitted to recommending users through an Elo-
inspired “attractiveness” score based on the ratio of right to left swipes they receive 
(“Powering Tinder®”, 2019). Elo-scores rank people in competitive, zero-sum games 
like chess. On swipe apps, a user’s score would go down every time they “lost” a 
swiping event: for instance, if they swiped right on someone that later swiped left on 
them. Swiping right on users with lower attractiveness scores would also decrease one’s 
score, leading to fewer, “less-attractive,” and slower recommendations. Measuring users 
in this way does not sit well with the notion that attraction can be idiosyncratic. It 
marginalizes those who are not attractive to a majority of other users. And it 
incentivizes a competitive approach to dating. 
 
3 OkCupid’s match percentage can still be used as its recommender system, but it is no longer 
its default system, and the ease of swiping on its app has habituated users to using it in the 
absent-minded way I detailed above. I mention it here to show how different it is from 
swipe app recommender systems and to highlight the fact that the transition to swiping is 
likely to amplify racially biased outcomes in the date-o-sphere. 
 
 
Tinder’s attractiveness scale is thus likely to lead to very different outcomes 
than OkCupid’s match algorithm. Instead of matching users on an individual basis using 
hundreds of different variables, it employs a hierarchical ranking system based on how 
often profiles are liked or rejected. So my argument is not that there are people who 
have racial preferences, disavowed racial preferences, or unconscious racial preferences 
on swipe apps. This is obvious. And as Benjamin has warned, focusing on individual 
racism often distracts us from the subtle ways racial bias gets embedded in code (2019). 
My argument is that using a hierarchical ranking system based on looks to recommend 
users to each other embeds each one of these levels – from outright racism to 
unconscious preferences – into it. In fact, even if people merely prefer to date their own 
race, pooled attractiveness scores would disadvantage racial minorities simply if fewer 
of them were using the app. On swipe apps, then, the zero-sum game being played is 
decidedly not like chess: it amplifies a racial hierarchy of users by assessing them 
according to pooled preferences and using those assessments as the basis for 
recommendations. 
The move to swipe apps thus dovetails with neoliberal methods of measure that 
Foucault has outlined (2010): it amplifies minute differences in society by turning 
everything into a competition, ranking people according to how they fare in those 
competitions, and allocating resources according to those rankings. By putting users in 
direct competition with each other, ranking them on a single dimension, and measuring 
attraction as a zero-sum game, they put race to work as grist for algorithms distributing 
affect according each user’s presumed capacity to generate a profit. In this way, they 
increase the salience of race as a factor of success in today’s dating games, even when 
race is not used as a parameter in their recommender systems, most people are open to 
 
 
dating all races, and user’s do not know their swiping decisions are being used to create 
a racial hierarchy of “attractiveness.”  
So while algorithms on dating platforms have been critiqued as mere marketing 
ploys (Finkel et al., 2012; Joel et al., 2017b), we should not stop at this critique. The 
way they facilitate connections, order profiles, and distribute likes matters, precisely 
because they do not work as advertised. More than merely validate or invalidate one’s 
sense of self-worth, they influence whether users will get matches in the future and with 
whom those matches will be with, as well as who continues to use them and who does 
not.  
As persons of colour, Julie and Grace understood swipe apps to be rigged 
against them because of the matches, recommendations, and messages they received. As 
Julie put it, “you can tell the Tinder rating by who you are receiving,” and she was not 
seeing the men she preferred to meet. It might be tempting to think that the racial 
preferences Julia and Grace have, preferring Asian and white over black men, negate 
the claim I am making that swipe apps disenfranchise them. But this would be to shift 
the focus back on the personal choices that people make. To be clear, there is absolutely 
no reason to tether personal preference for certain races to biased outcomes on 
platforms; rather, it is the user interfaces and algorithmic sorting mechanisms of swipe 
apps that create a milieu in which unconscious racial biases get embed in the networks 
they set in motion. The comparison between OkCupid’s match percentage and Tinder’s 
“attractiveness” scale makes it clear that personal preferences can be put to use by 
algorithms in very different ways.  
Insofar as swipe apps encourage the disassociation of personal choices from 
networked effects in the minds of users, they conform to two key feature of the user 
unconscious: first, “the separation of the personal and the networked is more imagined 
 
 
than actual;” and second, this imagined separation invites users “to be caught in public 
acting privately” (Clough, 2018a, p. 77). This ideological severing of the personal from 
the networked is an effect of the swipe drive, where users are encouraged to swipe for 
the dopamine even when they consider this to be a “mindless, pointless act,” as Stacy 
put it. Precisely because swiping feels mindless and pointless, it is easy to sift through 
dozens of profiles a minute without thinking about why one is swiping left or right. The 
litany of left swipes quoted from my interview with Jenny indicates how race can make 
its way into one’s swiping decisions, almost as an afterthought. After all, race came up 
in just one of a few dozen of her swiping decisions, along with other superficial reasons 
for swiping left – wearing sunglasses, having a picture with one’s nephew, or not liking 
someone’s face, for example. It should also be noted that much of the feedback I 
received during the swiping part of my interviews came after much prompting. To me, 
this indicates that my respondents were not accustomed to articulating, or even thinking 
about, why they were swiping left or right. It is thus unlikely that their swiping 
decisions would have been consciously thought out had I not been prompting them to 
express why they were swiping left or right.  
The mindless swiping that swipe apps encourage makes it easier to engage them 
without thinking about the implications of one’s swiping decisions. Circumventing 
deliberate thought processes on swipe apps is also easier because no box needs to be 
checked to indicate one is looking for certain races. In contrast to swiping, clicking a 
box to filter for race “seems racist,” as Jon rightfully notes. Thus, filtering by swiping 
makes it easier for users to distance themselves from their racial preferences. This is 
alluded to by Crystal, who notes that she would not check a box to filter for race even if, 
as she says, “my mind would have been thinking it. Or even if I had it written on a piece 
of paper.” Likewise, Julie is able to mindlessly swipe according to her personal 
 
 
preference for certain races on Tinder without having to “feel bad about discounting 
people.”  
While it is not clear if having a preference to date a certain race over another is 
racist, it has been well documented that users of dating websites have such preferences 
(Alhabash et al., 2014; Anderson et al., 2014; Lin & Lundquist, 2013; Rudder, 2015). 
So swipe apps do not make people more racist. Rather, they provide a context in which 
unconscious racial biases can flourish because they can be expressed without troubling 
users’ self-perceptions of themselves as being non-racist. These are contexts in which 
the aversive racism widespread today is exacerbated (Dovidio et al., 2016). In other 
words, swipe apps create highly suitable milieus for unconscious forms of racism to be 
amplified by networked flows of affect.  
Risking oversimplification for added clarity, we might think of right swipes as 
positive affects looking to connect and left swipes as negative ones to disconnect, as I 
mentioned in the theoretical framework of this paper. These affects can then be set in 
motion by recommender systems looking to generate a profit. In general, these systems 
make connections quickly and frequently for those amassing a lot of right swipes or 
who simply pay for those connections. This can be seen as linked to a libidinous 
impulse within society, what Freud saw as “eros”. The obverse of this would then be 
users that amass a lot of left swipes and are ignored by recommender systems. They are 
left to suffer a slow social death, relegated to the bottom of the stack of profiles that 
others swipe through. The pooled preferences that swipe apps amplify thus ensure social 
death undergirds the perpetuation of privilege, making it easier for a select few to find 
sexual satisfaction, intimacy, and love.  
In the beginning of this paper, I mentioned Noble’s (2018) claim that by opening 
up the black box of algorithmic media we could “transform the consciousness 
 
 
embedded in artificial intelligence, since it is in fact, in part, a product of our own 
collective creation” (p. 29). This is a laudable goal. But as she also notes, algorithmic 
media cannot be disentangled from the primitive accumulation at the root of capitalism 
(Couldry & Mejias, 2019), financial futures devised to speculate upon black bodies 
during the slave trade (Keeling, 2019), and structural racism in the criminal justice 
system (Alexander, 2012). These roots of racial capitalism are now embedded in a new 
Jim code (Benjamin, 2019), where algorithms of oppression (Noble, 2018) perpetuate 
quotidian violence against black futures (Keeling, 2019). As these theorists make clear, 
racist practices, systems, and ways of thinking we often pride ourselves on having 
moved beyond as a society – slavery, Jim Crow, segregation, bigotry, xenophobia, etc. – 
have a tendency to erupt into public attention only to be hidden deeper within social 
structures soon after. Today they are embedded in algorithmic code animating a user 
unconscious. While the metaphor of the black box and calls for transparency are 
needed, then, seeing this user unconscious as repressing the unseemly side of algorithms 
sheds light on why those calls are rarely heeded, rendering concrete the quandary 
algorithmic media present us with today.  
Part of the promise of algorithmic media is that they could allow us to overcome 
injustices felt most acutely at intersections of race, class, gender, ability, and sexuality 
by circumventing human prejudice. But they often lead to more inequitable outcomes 
than human decision-making had. The common assumption that algorithms are 
intelligent is thus only possible because their unintelligence is hidden. That is, 
algorithmic media are opaque precisely because this allows the inequity amplified by 
them to be repressed, keeping the social death of those they systematically marginalize 
again and again from public scrutiny. Repressing the racial hierarchy of attraction swipe 
apps amplify, the user unconscious hides the historical trauma they perpetuate within 
 
 
impenetrable jumbles of code, preventing the traumatic return of racial bias from 
gumming up their continued seamless generation of profits. 
Conclusion 
This paper has outlined an increasingly salient quandary algorithmic media presents to 
socially conscious scholars, users, and creators: as their oppression is decried with 
heightened alarm, they continue to sever the loop of the conscious self from speculating 
algorithms (Hansen, 2015), human understanding from machine learning (Hayles, 
2017), and AI from the user unconscious. By capturing, calculating, and manipulating 
unconscious processes, they make it difficult to see where resistance to the oppression 
they amplify might come.  
Capturing vast troves of data from the inattentive performativity of users, 
today’s algorithms work to mine the depths of unconscious desire for profitable 
extraction. Swipe apps are at the cusp of this data logic. They turn the intractable 
messiness of intimacy into grist for algorithms carving up users according to their 
presumed profitability or lack thereof. They thus constitute a quintessential example of 
the way population racism is amplified today: by capturing and recursively coupling 
users’ digital traces of desire with carefully calibrated affective flows.  
While Freud had described the entropic drive within us as bringing us ever 
closer to death, this drive can now be seen as animating the shadowy agency of a user 
unconscious within algorithmic media. Working through swipe apps to compel, amass, 
and agglomerate digital traces of desire, this unconscious affords social connection, 
engagement, and intimacy for some only against an underlying amplification of social 
death for others. It can thus be seen as the latest formation perpetuating the ideological 
roots of capitalism – bigotry, xenophobia, racism, etc. – by embedding them in 
impenetrable jumbles of code. Repressing these disturbing modes of distributed 
 
 
thought, the user unconscious prevents the quotidian violence platforms implicate users 
within from gumming up their continued seamless generation of profits.  
Donna Haraway once said, “our machines are disturbingly lively, and we 
ourselves frighteningly inert” (1990, p. 152). But a time when we could think of “our 
machines” or “we ourselves” is past. We entail machines, just as machines entail us. 
Indeed, that disturbingly lively ghost in the machine – uncannily repeating past 
traumatic modes of thought again and again – is us as we become users. Haunted by 
disavowed traces of desire and animated by speculating algorithms, we are incessantly 
rendered as so much digital grist for algorithmic media to mine for profits despite the all 
too familiar way those profits are made.  
If these algorithms are to be resisted, new tools must be devised to gain some 
purchase on the affective milieus they set in motion. My hope is the lens of the uncanny 
user unconscious proves useful as one such tool. Estranging us from the familiar 
narratives we tell about ourselves while revealing our thoughts to be abhorrent in an all 
too familiar way, it enables the affective registration of distributed thoughts disavowed 
by the very users they are created from and coupled with. It might thus assist those 
working to envision protocols of engagement more likely to mitigate than amplify 
social inequity. 
Works Cited 
Alexander, M. (2012). The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of 
Colorblindness. The New Press. 
Alhabash, S., Hales, K., Baek, J., & Oh, H. J. (2014). Effects of race, visual anonymity, 
and social category salience on online dating outcomes. Computers in Human 
Behavior, 35, 22–32. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2014.02.016 
 
 
Anderson, A., Goel, S., Huber, G., Malhotra, N., & Watts, D. (2014). Political Ideology 
and Racial Preferences in Online Dating. Sociological Science, 28–40. 
https://doi.org/10.15195/v1.a3 
Ansari, A., & Klinenberg, E. (2016). Modern Romance (Reprint edition). Penguin 
Books. 
Beer, D. (2018). The Data Gaze: Capitalism, Power and Perception. SAGE. 
Benjamin, R. (2019). Race After Technology: Abolitionist Tools for the New Jim Code 
(1 edition). Polity. 
Broussard, M. (2018). Artificial Unintelligence: How Computers Misunderstand the 
World. The MIT Press. 
Bucher, T. (2017). The algorithmic imaginary: Exploring the ordinary affects of 
Facebook algorithms. Information, Communication & Society, 20(1), 30–44. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2016.1154086 
Cacioppo, J. T., Cacioppo, S., Gonzaga, G. C., Ogburn, E. L., & VanderWeele, T. J. 
(2013). Marital satisfaction and break-ups differ across on-line and off-line 
meeting venues. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 110(25), 
10135–10140. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1222447110 
Carpenter, C. J., & McEwan, B. (2016). The players of micro-dating: Individual and 
gender differences in goal orientations toward micro-dating apps. First Monday, 
21(5). https://doi.org/10.5210/fm.v21i5.6187 
Castells, M. (2009). The Rise of the Network Society: The Information Age: Economy, 
Society, and Culture Volume I (2nd Edition with a New Preface edition). Wiley-
Blackwell. 
Cheney-Lippold, J. (2017). We are data: Algorithms and the making of our digital 
selves. New York University Press. 
 
 
Chun, W. H. K. (2016). Updating to Remain the Same: Habitual New Media. The MIT 
Press. 
Clough, P. T. (2003). Affect and Control: Rethinking the Body ‘Beyond Sex and 
Gender.’ Feminist Theory, 4(3), 359–364. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/14647001030043010 
Clough, P. T. (2010). The affective turn. Political economy, biomedia, and bodies. In 
M. Gregg & G. J. Seigworth (Eds.), The Affect Theory Reader (unknown 
edition, pp. 206–225). Duke University Press Books. 
Clough, P. T. (2018a). The Other-Than-Human and the “User Unconscious.” Studies in 
Gender and Sexuality, 19(1), 73–80. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/15240657.2018.1419683 
Clough, P. T. (2018b). The User Unconscious: On Affect, Media, and Measure (1 
edition). Univ Of Minnesota Press. 
Clough, P. T. (2019). Notes on Psychoanalysis and Technology, the Psyche and the 
Social. Studies in Gender and Sexuality, 20(2), 75–83. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/15240657.2019.1594043 
Clough, P. T., & Johanssen, J. (2020). By the Skin of Our Machines: Psychoanalysis 
Beyond the Human A Dialogue Between Patricia Clough and Jacob Johanssen. 
Capacious: Journal for Emerging Affect Inquiry. 
https://doi.org/10.22387/CAP2020.46 
Clough, P. T., & Willse, C. (2011). Beyond Biopolitics: Essays on the Governance of 
Life and Death. Duke University Press Books. 
Cotter, K. (2019). Playing the visibility game: How digital influencers and algorithms 




Couldry, N., & Mejias, U. A. (2019). The Costs of Connection: How Data Is Colonizing 
Human Life and Appropriating It for Capitalism (1 edition). Stanford University 
Press. 
David, G., & Cambre, C. (2016). Screened Intimacies: Tinder and the Swipe Logic. 
Social Media + Society, 2(2), 2056305116641976. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/2056305116641976 
Dean, J. (2009). Drive as the Structure of Biopolitics (SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 
1460759). Social Science Research Network. 
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1460759 
Deleuze, G. (1992). Postscript on the Societies of Control. October, 59, 3–7. 
Dovidio, J. F., Gaertner, S. L., & Pearson, A. R. (2016). Aversive Racism and 
Contemporary Bias. In C. G. Sibley & F. K. Barlow (Eds.), The Cambridge 
Handbook of the Psychology of Prejudice (pp. 267–294). Cambridge University 
Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316161579.012 
Enomoto, C., Noor, S., & Widner, B. (2017). Is Social Media to Blame for the Sharp 
Rise in STDs? Social Sciences, 6(3), 78. https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci6030078 
Finkel, E. J., Eastwick, P. W., Karney, B. R., Reis, H. T., & Sprecher, S. (2012). Online 
Dating A Critical Analysis From the Perspective of Psychological Science. 
Psychological Science in the Public Interest, 13(1), 3–66. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1529100612436522 
Fisher, M. (2018). K-punk: The Collected and Unpublished Writings of Mark Fisher (D. 
Ambrose, Ed.; New edition edition). Repeater. 




Foucault, M. (2010). The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978--
1979 (Reprint edition). Picador. 
Freud, S. (2003). The Uncanny. Penguin. 
Freud, S. (2019). Civilization and Its Discontents: Adapted for the Contemporary 
Reader (J. Harris, Trans.). Independently published. 
Fuller, M., & Goffey, A. (2012). Evil Media. MIT Press. 
Hallinan, B., Brubaker, J. R., & Fiesler, C. (2020). Unexpected expectations: Public 
reaction to the Facebook emotional contagion study. New Media & Society, 
22(6), 1076–1094. https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444819876944 
Hansen, M. B. N. (2015). Feed-Forward: On the Future of Twenty-First-Century 
Media. University Of Chicago Press. 
Haraway, D. (1990). Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature (First 
Thus edition). Routledge. 
Hardt, M., & Negri, A. (2001). Empire. Harvard University Press. 
Hartman, S. (2019). Hashtag Mania or Misadventures in the #ultrapsychic. Studies in 
Gender and Sexuality, 20(2), 84–100. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/15240657.2019.1594044 
Hartman, S. (2020). Binded by the White: A Discussion of “Fanon’s Vision of 
Embodied Racism for Psychoanalytic Theory and Practice.” Psychoanalytic 
Dialogues, 30(3), 317–324. https://doi.org/10.1080/10481885.2020.1744965 
Hayles, N. K. (2017). Unthought: The Power of the Cognitive Nonconscious. University 
of Chicago Press. 
Hitsch, G. J., Hortaçsu, A., & Ariely, D. (2010). Matching and Sorting in Online 
Dating. The American Economic Review, 100(1), 130–163. 
 
 
Hobbs, M., Owen, S., & Gerber, L. (2016). Liquid love? Dating apps, sex, relationships 
and the digital transformation of intimacy. Journal of Sociology, 
1440783316662718. https://doi.org/10.1177/1440783316662718 
Hutson, J. A., Taft, J. G., Barocas, S., & Levy, K. (2018). Debiasing Desire: Addressing 
Bias & Discrimination on Intimate Platforms. Proceedings of the ACM on 
Human-Computer Interaction, 2(CSCW), 73:1–73:18. 
https://doi.org/10.1145/3274342 
Joel, S., Eastwick, P., & Finkel, E. (2017a). Is Romantic Desire Predictable? Machine 
Learning Applied to Initial Romantic Attraction. Psychological Science, 28, 
095679761771458. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797617714580 
Joel, S., Eastwick, P. W., & Finkel, E. J. (2017b). Is Romantic Desire Predictable? 
Machine Learning Applied to Initial Romantic Attraction. Psychological 
Science, 28(10), 1478–1489. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797617714580 
Keeling, K. (2019). Queer Times, Black Futures. NYU Press. 
Kernberg, O. (2009). The concept of the death drive: A clinical perspective. The 
International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 90(5), 1009–1023. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-8315.2009.00187.x 
Lacan, J. (1997). The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: The Ethics Of Psychoanalysis (J. 
Alain-Miller, Ed.; D. Porter, Trans.). W. W. Norton & Company. 
Light, B., Burgess, J., & Duguay, S. (2016). The walkthrough method: An approach to 
the study of apps: New Media & Society. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444816675438 
Lin, K.-H., & Lundquist, J. (2013). Mate Selection in Cyberspace: The Intersection of 




Noble, S. U. (2018). Algorithms of Oppression: How Search Engines Reinforce Racism. 
NYU Press. 
O’Neil, C. (2016). Weapons of Math Destruction: How Big Data Increases Inequality 
and Threatens Democracy (1 edition). Crown. 
Parisi, Lorenza, & Comunello, F. (2020). Dating in the time of “relational filter 
bubbles”: Exploring imaginaries, perceptions and tactics of Italian dating app 
users. The Communication Review, 23(1), 66–89. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/10714421.2019.1704111 
Parisi, Luciana. (2004). Abstract Sex: Philosophy, Biotechnology and the Mutations of 
Desire (1 edition). Bloomsbury Academic. 
Pasquale, F. (2016). The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms That Control Money 
and Information (Reprint edition). Harvard University Press. 
Powering Tinder®—The Method Behind Our Matching. (2019, March 15). Tinder. 
https://blog.gotinder.com/powering-tinder-r-the-method-behind-our-matching/ 
Rosenfeld, M. J., & Thomas, R. J. (2012). Searching for a Mate: The Rise of the 
Internet as a Social Intermediary. American Sociological Review, 77(4), 523–
547. https://doi.org/10.1177/0003122412448050 
Rosenfeld, M. J., Thomas, R. J., & Hausen, S. (2019). Disintermediating your friends: 
How online dating in the United States displaces other ways of meeting. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 116(36), 17753–17758. 
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1908630116 
Rozmarin, E. (2020). The Subject as Threshold. American Imago, 77(2), 309–336. 
https://doi.org/10.1353/aim.2020.0023 
Rudder, C. (2015). Dataclysm: Love, Sex, Race, and Identity--What Our Online Lives 
Tell Us about Our Offline Selves. Broadway Books. 
 
 
Sampson, T. (2016). The Assemblage Brain (1 edition). University of Minnesota Press. 
Sharabi, L. L. (2020). Exploring How Beliefs About Algorithms Shape (Offline) 
Success in Online Dating: A Two-Wave Longitudinal Investigation. 
Communication Research, 0093650219896936. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0093650219896936 
Sharabi, L. L., & Dykstra-DeVette, T. A. (2019). From first email to first date: 
Strategies for initiating relationships in online dating: Journal of Social and 
Personal Relationships. https://doi.org/10.1177/0265407518822780 
Slater, D. (2013). Love in the Time of Algorithms: What Technology Does to Meeting 
and Mating. Current. 
Srnicek, N. (2016). Platform Capitalism (1 edition). Polity. 
Tran The, J., Ansermet, J.-P., Magistretti, P., & Ansermet, F. (2020). From the Principle 
of Inertia to the Death Drive: The Influence of the Second Law of 
Thermodynamics on the Freudian Theory of the Psychical Apparatus. Frontiers 
in Psychology, 11, 325. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.00325 
van der Nagel, E. (2018). ‘Networks that work too well’: Intervening in algorithmic 
connections. Media International Australia, 168(1), 81–92. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1329878X18783002 
Wang, S. (2020). Calculating dating goals: Data gaming and algorithmic sociality on 
Blued, a Chinese gay dating app. Information, Communication & Society, 23(2), 
181–197. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2018.1490796 
Wang, T., Liu, H., He, J., Jiang, X., & Du, X. (2011). Predicting New User’s Behavior 
in Online Dating Systems. In J. Tang, I. King, L. Chen, & J. Wang (Eds.), 
Advanced Data Mining and Applications (pp. 266–277). Springer Berlin 
Heidelberg. http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-642-25856-5_20 
 
 
 
